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Abstract Exposure to Technologically Enhanced Natu-
rally Occurring Nuclear Radioactive Material (TENORM)
from oil and gas drilling and production activities can have
effects on both the environment and workers involved in
the industry. There is a significant lack of available infor-
mation regarding dynamic modeling and risk assessment of
TENORM occupational exposure in the oil and gas
industry, and available studies show that workers in the
field are at risk of being exposed to varying levels of
radiation. This paper presents a methodology to bridge this
knowledge gap by modeling workforce TENORM radia-
tion exposure at different oil and gas operation stages. This
was achieved by integrating SHIPP (System Hazard Iden-
tification, Prediction and Prevention) Methodology And
Rational Theory (SMART approach). The SMART
approach was applied to develop an integrated framework
for TENORM occupational exposure risk assessment.
Application of the proposed approach is illustrated with a
scenario, and outcomes from modeling this scenario
explain how system degraded as a function of safety barrier
performance.
Keywords TENORM  Occupational risk  Radiation risk
assessment  SMART approach  Rational theory
Introduction
Thirty years worth of research has supported the fact that
exposure to Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occur-
ring Nuclear Radioactive Materials (TENORM) poses
significant risks to people involved in the oil and gas
industry (Gesell 1975; Steinha¨usler 2005). Regardless of
the exposure level, catastrophic cancer could be the even-
tual consequences of radiation exposure (ALNabhani et al.
2016b). Therefore, accident mitigation involving radio-
logical exposure in the oil and gas industry can be con-
ducted at an early stage through preventative
methodologies, including ensuring effective maintenance
of appropriate safety measures and barriers, to reduce risk
and life-threatening situations. Radiological poisoning
from chronic exposure to TENORM is cumulative and thus
would be difficult to identify, especially in early stages;
therefore, it could take many years for negative health
effects to be manifested. The danger of radiation exposure
could be combated by periodic medical check-ups for
cancer and other negative effects. This situation could be
improved by predicting, controlling and mitigating expo-
sure at the source, as well as emphasizing incident pre-
vention to achieve an inherently safer process design to
enhance safety. In order to protect health and increase
safety by preventing instances of major exposure, it is
critical to ascertain the presence and adequacy of safety
prevention barriers. The paper focuses on TENORM
exposure modeling and risk assessment in typical oil and
gas extraction and production operations using the SHIPP
(System Hazard Identification, Prediction and Prevention)
Methodology And Rational Theory (SMART approach).
The proposed approach has the following unique features:
(1) dynamic modeling of TENORM occupational exposure
considering safety barrier performance, (2) uncertainty
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reduction throughout prediction of the failure probabilities
of safety barriers, and (3) dynamic updating of event
probability as new information becomes available. The
proposed approach provides an integrated framework for
dynamic prediction and TENORM exposure risk informa-
tion updating. The outcome of this approach would help to
monitor radiation exposure risk, support the development
of effective safety measures and protective measures and
minimize the overall oil and gas operation risk.
TENORM exposure modeling and risk assessment
using the SMART approach
The SMART approach combines the SHIPP methodology
and rational theory. The SHIPP methodology is a generic
framework used to identify, evaluate and model process
accidents (Rathnayakaa et al. 2011). Rational theory is
used to model accident causation behavior that usually
contributes to its occurrence based on logical, inductive
and probabilistic analysis. The basic premise of rational
theory is that an accident occurrence is a result of joint
conditional behavior among different parameters. By
integrating the SHIPP methodology and rational theory, the
SMART approach is able to: (1) identify the interaction
between systems and their subsystems, the source of
TENORM and its distribution in oil and gas extraction and
production processes; (2) identify and analyze TENORM
exposure scenarios; (3) model different radiation exposure
scenarios based on the safety barriers performance using
Monte Carlo simulation; (4) predict and update the iden-
tified safety barriers failure probabilities; (5) enable
proactive management of TENORM risks using either
adaptive risk management or precautionary principle
methodologies. Figure 1 presents the SMART approach
flowchart developed for TENORM occupational exposure
risk modeling. The proposed approach was demonstrated
and validated using a case study of TENORM occupational
exposure scenarios for a 2271 worker sample involved in
different kinds of typical oil and gas activities.
TENORM occupational exposure scenario
modeling and prediction
In the present study, scenarios of TENORM occupational
exposure were modeled and simulated using the SMART
approach. A sample was taken of 2271 workers involved in
different oilfield activities, as shown in Fig. 2 in order to
simulate different possible radiological occupational
exposure in the oil and gas industry as a result of possible
failure of identified safety barriers. A period of ten years
was considered for serious carcinogenic risk. The prior
estimate of abnormal events was used for preliminary
decision making, and then the Bayesian theorem was uti-
lized to calculate the posterior failure probabilities of safety
barriers during the ensuing time interval, to which the
consequence probabilities were generated through an event
tree analysis. As new evidence or new information became
available at any time during evaluation process, accord-
ingly the safety barrier failure probabilities were updated
dynamically. Subsequently, updated risk for each conse-
quence level was estimated using new posterior failure
probabilities. This way time-dependent risk profiles were
developed dynamically for each TENORM exposure. The
intention of the SMART approach was to develop effective
risk management strategies to aid in identifying critical
safety barriers that need to be maintained in the oil and gas
industry and achieve the lowest risk.
System identification
During oil and gas extraction and production procedures,
the oil, gas, formation water and TENORM mixture
ascends to the surface via drilled wells through down-hole
completion and production equipment. This mixture then
travels to midstream equipment via a separator, which
removes the gas and relays it to a downstream gas purifi-
cation plant. The degassed oil stream is further pumped to
midstream production from the upstream facilities via flow
lines. Gathering and production stations then remove the
oily sludge, sand and geological formation water that are
contaminated with TENORM. A portion of the TENORM
has a solidified form and deposits on the oil field extraction
and production equipment internal surfaces (Testa et al.
1994; Kvasnicka 1996; Al-Masri and Aba 2005; Othman
et al. 2005; ALNabhani et al. 2015). Pipelines transport
crude oil to downstream facilities for further refining,
where the refined products may still harbor TENORM.
Smith (1992) reported that TENORM can be transported in
different forms in the produced hydrocarbons, which con-
firms their existence wherever there is oil and gas or related
products used in power plants, petrochemicals and manu-
facturing industries. Al-Masri and Haddad (2012) con-
cluded from their study on TENORM emissions from oil-
and gas-fired power plants that TENORM was present in
fly and bottom ash collected from major Syrian power
plants fired by heavy oil and natural gas. On the other hand,
many scholars have reported that benzene used in several
industry applications found to cause carcinogenic diseases
associated with leukemia, and more specifically with acute
myeloid leukemia cancer (Vigliani and Saita 1964; Aksoy
et al. 1974; Infante et al. 1977; Yin et al. 1978; Jamall and
Willhiteb 2008; WHO 2010).
J Petrol Explor Prod Technol
123
Safety barriers identification and evaluation
During oil and gas extraction and production processes,
five sequential and interconnected safety barriers for radi-
ation prevention could be identified, and they are as
follows:
(1) Early Detection Safety Prevention Barrier (EDSPB).
This is considered to be the release prevention barrier
(RPB) that is responsible for preventing the initiating
event for TENORM release at the upstream source.
This includes, but is not limited to, the following sub-
barriers:
• Field and well logging data, such as spectral
gamma logs that provide information on early
TENORM presence, and its level of radioactivity
prediction.
• Down-hole real-time detectors that are capable of
detecting the radioactive level from rock forma-
tion during drilling activities. Surface sensors
should also be fixed at different locations in
drilling rigs such as at the cellar, wellhead, flow
line connected to bell nipple, mud system, waste
pits and rig floor.
• Sensors can be fixed also in flow lines between the
wellhead and gathering stations, equipment in the
gathering and production stations such as separa-
tion tanks and eventually in refinery utilities,
particularly in storage tanks.
Fig. 1 Algorithm of SMART
approach
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(2) Isolation Integrity Safety Prevention Barrier (IISPB).
This is considered to be a dispersion prevention
barrier (DPB) at the upstream, midstream and down-
stream phase. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following sub-barriers: equipment insulation carrying
TNEROM coproduced with oil and gas, including
downhole equipment, wellheads, flow lines, separa-
tion tanks, pumps and other associated processing
equipment in gathering and production stations;
emergency shut-down mechanisms and work permits.
(3) Personal Protection Equipment and Exposure Dura-
tion Safety Prevention Barrier (PPE&EDSPB). It
includes, but is not limited to, the following sub-
barriers: disposable leaded shield personal protection
equipment (overalls, face mask, hand gloves and
safety boots) and personal radiation monitors.
(4) Emergency Management Safety Prevention Barrier
(EMSPB). This safety barrier is considered as the
mitigation barrier to control hazardous TENORM expo-
sure and its consequences. It includes, but is not limited
to, the following sub-barriers: emergency response plan,
emergency preparedness, emergency medical plan,
emergency and safety drills, worker awareness and
participation in radiation training programs.
(5) Management and Organization Safety Prevention
Barrier (M&OSPB). This safety barrier intervenes
either positively or negatively with all other barriers
based on the management’s behavior and responsi-
bility. It includes, but is not limited to, the following
sub-barriers: training programs, safety polices, oper-
ating procedures, decision making, management
practices and knowledge, leadership and
communication.
The associated event tree model was utilized to
demonstrate the consequences of TENORM exposure
based on the failure of each of these identified safety bar-
riers. These five safety barriers were assigned six possible
states ranging from safe to catastrophe. The occurrence of
each state is possible through failure of different safety
barriers, as is shown in Fig. 3.
In this risk assessment, the radiation exposure scenario
was described in terms of safety barrier failures. Due to a
dearth of relevant literature on this subject, the failure
probabilities of the identified safety barriers were assigned
by expert judgment with the support of professional aca-
demic experts from Centre for Risk, Integrity and Safety
Engineering (C-RISE-Memorial University) (Table 1).
These values are utilized here for illustration and validation
purposes.
The failure and success of a safety barrier is represented
as node with two outcomes. For example, if first safety
Fig. 2 An overview of TENORM presence during oil and gas extraction and production activates
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barrier EDSPB is successful, then the desirable outcome is
‘‘safe.’’ If it is unsuccessful, the penultimate safety barrier,
IISPB, is activated. If this node is successful, the outcome
is labeled ‘‘near miss.’’ If unsuccessful, the safety function
PPE&EDSPB is activated. The successful outcome of this
node is ‘‘mishap.’’ In the case of a failure, then the next
safety barrier, EMSPB, is activated which leads to the
consequence labeled ‘‘Incident.’’ If this barrier fails, the
last safety barrier M&OSPB is activated. When M&OSPB
is successful, the end state is labeled ‘‘accident.’’ If
M&OSPB is unsuccessful, the end-state consequence is
labeled ‘‘catastrophe.’’
The prior probability of each outcome (consequence
severity level k (k = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6), denoted by P(Ck),
is given as:
P Ckð Þ ¼PXh;I;ki 1 xið Þ1hi;k
j 2 SBk
ð1Þ
where SBk denotes the safety barrier associated with the
level k and hi,k = 1 if the level k failure passes the down-
branch (failure) of safety barrier i; hi,k = 0 if the level
k failure passes the up-branch (success) of safety barrier
i. Table 2 illustrates prior probabilities of consequence
occurrence.
Modeling prediction and updating
Conditional or marginal probability approaches are widely
utilized in classical accident modeling and risk assessment.
These approaches are inaccurate predictors for a wide
range of operating conditions (Tesfatsion 2015). However,
the SMART approach is predicated on a rational prediction
model attempting to ensure a more accurate predictive
model for TENORM occupational exposure and associated
risk by considering the two adjoined events (safety barriers
failures and abnormal events) rather than a single event
(abnormal events). Therefore, having a more accurate
predictive model will enhance the safety system improve-
ment decisions accuracy. Mathematically, the rational
prediction model is presented as follows:
P datað Þ ¼ P data jXið Þ
P datað Þ ¼ P data jTrueð Þ
P Xið Þ ¼ x : Xi xð Þf gj j= x : truej j
Then conditional probability expressed as:
P data jXið Þ ¼ x : Xi xð Þ and data Xð Þf gj j= x : Xi xð Þj j
Finally, the joint probability of this model expressed as:
Fig. 3 Event tree of TENORM occupational exposure in oil and gas industry
Table 1 Failure probability of safety barriers (based on expert judgment, C-RISE, Memorial University)
Safety barrier (Xi) Failure probability P(Xi)
Early Detection Safety Prevention Barrier-EDSPB 0.20
Isolation Integrity Safety Prevention Barrier-IISPB 0.05
Personal Protection Equipment and Exposure Duration Safety Prevention Barrier-PPE&EDSPB 0.05
Emergency Management Safety Prevention Barrier-EMSPB 0.10
Management & Organization Safety Prevention Barrier-M&O SPB 0.10
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P Xi and datað Þ ¼ x : Xi xð Þ and data xð Þf gj j= x : truej j
¼ x : Xi xð Þ and data xð Þf gj j
f x : Xi xð Þf gj j= x : Xi xð Þf gj jx : truejð Þ
¼ P Xið ÞP data jXið Þ
Using symmetry, this equation can be written as Bayes
law as expressed in Eq. (2) (which is the base of this
model) to estimate the likelihood and update failure
probability of safety barriers in the next time interval
(t ? 1)
P Xi and datað Þ ¼ PðdatajXiÞ  PðXiÞ ð2Þ
where
• P(Xi and data) is the joint probability of two events
(failure of safety barrier will occur first, and then
abnormal event will take place and vice versa).
• P(data |Xi) is the occurrence of abnormal events ‘‘data’’
given failures of safety barriers ‘‘Xi’’ have occurred.
• P(Xi) is the prior failure probabilities of safety barriers
‘‘Xi’’.
Failure probability estimation
The first step in the predictive model is to estimate the
failure probability of the safety barriers for next time
interval to prevent TENORM occupational exposure in oil
and gas industry. Therefore, cumulative abnormal event
data are a necessity to estimate the failure probability.
These data were assumed with the consensus of technical
experts according to the safety barriers failures to reflect
the actuality of TENORM occupational exposure for ten
years for workers involved in different oilfield oil and gas
activities. Cumulative abnormal event data are shown in
Table 3. The probabilities (Table 4) of precursors to
abnormal events were computed based on the data pro-
vided in Table 3.
According to rational theory, the SMART approach
considers the joint probability of occurrence of both events
P(Xi and data) as a basis for the ensuing prediction of
failure probability that are presented in Table 5.
Rational cumulative precursor data P(Xi and data) were
then simulated using Monte Carlo simulation, where the
objective was to simulate events of an identified period
(t = 10 years) in an existing scenario for one thousand cycles
to model all possible accidents processes and their causative
behaviors based on the safety barriers performance as well
as to determine how random variation and associated errors
affect the modeled parametric system uncertainty and per-
formance. The cumulative precursor data P(Xi and data) were
defined as input for the parametricmodel for simulation and is
denoted by f{(X1 and data), (X2 and data),…, (Xi and data)}.
The probability distribution of the defined parametric model
was utilized to generate another set of random inputs. These
newly generated inputs were then evaluated and the same
process was repeated for one thousand runs so that these data
best-matched with the other data, or best-represented the
current knowledge state, and are denoted by {(Xi and data)1,
(Xi and data)2,…, (Xi and data)q}. Table 6 illustrates the
improved quality of the cumulative precursor data of abnor-
mal events extracted randomly from the simulated data.
The generated data then were used to calculate the
likelihood failure probability of safety barrier in the next
time interval of ten years using Eq. (3):
p datajxið Þ ¼ NF;I j NF;i þ NS;i
  
NS;I ¼ NC;k; for k ¼ i
NF;i ¼
X
Nc;k; and k [ i;
i ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4 and k ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4; 5
ð3Þ
where Nc,k is the number of abnormal events of conse-
quence kth level, and NS,i and NF,i are the number of suc-
cesses and failures for the ith barrier.
The failure probabilities for all safety barriers are listed
in Table 7.
Safety barriers failure probability update
The Bayesian updating mechanism was then utilized to
update the safety barriers likelihood of failure probability
over the following ten years when new types of evidence
arise or changes occur in oil and gas processing. Thus,
updated failure probabilities uncover the consequence
occurrence probabilities, which were updated using event
tree analysis. According to rational theory, the failure
probabilities of a given safety barrier Xi are affected by a
combination of latent or physical and dependent or inde-
pendent random variables. These variables are considered as
new evidence and therefore are added to the predictive and
updating SMART model using the Bayesian updating theo-
rem (Bedford and Cooke 2001) as per Eq. (4) as follows.
Table 2 Prior estimates of occurrences of each consequence
Consequences (Ck) Occurrence probability P(Ck)
C1 (Safe) 0.8
C2 (Near miss) 0.19
C3 (Mishap) 9.5 9 10
-3
C4 (Incident) 4.5 9 10
-4
C5 (Accident) 4.5 9 10
-5
C6 Catastrophe 5.0 9 10
-6
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P Xijdatað Þ ¼ P datajXið Þ p Xið Þ½ =R P datajXið ÞP Xið Þ½  ð4Þ
where P(Xi|data) is the posterior failure probability of
safety barrier, P(data| Xi) is the likelihood failure
probability of safety barrier, p(xi) is the prior failure
probability of safety barrier, data are the new information
or evidences arrived and R [P(data|Xi) P(Xi)] is the nor-
malizing factor.
Table 3 Cumulative precursor data of abnormal events of TENORM exposure in oil and gas industry over 10 years
Years C1 Safe C2 Near miss C3 Mishap C4 Incident C5 Accident C6 Catastrophe
1 28 30 10 6 3 1
2 36 40 15 9 7 2
3 44 48 17 12 9 3
4 47 55 19 13 11 4
5 50 65 25 16 14 6
6 47 82 33 20 15 8
7 55 89 42 30 27 15
8 62 100 53 42 39 25
9 74 109 60 45 43 38
10 80 114 65 60 67 87
Total 523 732 339 253 235 189
Table 4 Probabilities of abnormal events precursor data of TENORM exposure in oil and gas industry over 10 years P(data|Xi)
Years C1 Safe C2 Near miss C3 Mishap C4 Incident C5 Accident C6 Catastrophe
1 0.359 0.385 0.128 0.077 0.038 0.013
2 0.330 0.367 0.138 0.083 0.064 0.018
3 0.331 0.361 0.128 0.090 0.068 0.023
4 0.315 0.369 0.128 0.087 0.074 0.027
5 0.284 0.369 0.142 0.091 0.080 0.034
6 0.229 0.400 0.161 0.098 0.073 0.039
7 0.213 0.345 0.163 0.116 0.105 0.058
8 0.193 0.312 0.165 0.131 0.121 0.078
9 0.201 0.295 0.163 0.122 0.117 0.103
10 0.169 0.241 0.137 0.127 0.142 0.184
Table 5 Rational probabilities of precursors of abnormal events of TENORM exposure in oil and gas industry over 10 years P(Xi and data)
Years C1 Safe C2 Near miss C3 Mishap C4 Incident C5 Accident C6 Catastrophe
1 0.187 0.077 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.001
2 0.172 0.073 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.002
3 0.172 0.072 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.002
4 0.164 0.074 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.003
5 0.148 0.074 0.014 0.005 0.008 0.003
6 0.119 0.080 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.004
7 0.111 0.069 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.006
8 0.100 0.062 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.008
9 0.104 0.059 0.008 0.006 0.012 0.010
10 0.088 0.048 0.007 0.006 0.014 0.018
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Table 8 and Fig. 4 illustrate the updated failure proba-
bility for safety barriers over ten years and updated based
on the arrival of new evidences that contributed into the
failure probability of safety barriers.
Consequence occurrence probability update
The updated failure probabilities of the safety barriers in
this model were utilized to estimate occurrence probabili-
ties for each severity level. These probabilities were then
fed into relevant branches of the event tree shown in Fig. 1,
and Eq. (1) is utilized to estimate the posterior occurrence
probabilities of each severity level over the ten years as
shown in Fig. 5. Table 9 illustrates posterior probabilities
of consequence occurrence in year ten.
Analysis and discussions
The dynamic TENORM occupational exposure modeling
risk was based on the performance of five identified
sequential barriers and their sub-elements that are mostly
absent in many oilfields. These safety barriers are the Early
Detection Safety Prevention Barrier (EDSPB); Isolation
Integrity Safety Prevention Barrier (IISPB); Personal Pro-
tection Equipment and Exposure Duration Safety Preven-
tion Barrier (PPE&EDSPB); Emergency Management
Safety Prevention Barrier (EMSPB) and Management and
Organization Safety Prevention Barrier (M&OSPB). To
test the model validity, a quantitative assessment was
performed using the SMART methodology coupled with a
probabilistic approach. Model validation was based on
three main phases comprised of safety barriers analyses
and evaluation, model prediction and updating and conse-
quence occurrence probability updating.
According to the prior results, the consequences of
higher severity have low probabilities of occurrence, which
is obvious in events of catastrophe and accident. On the
other hand, the consequences of lower severity have higher
probabilities, such as safe events. For example, the prob-
ability of maintaining a safe system was 0.8, whereas the
estimated probability of accident and catastrophic cancer
fatality were very low 4.5 9 10-5 and 5 9 10-6, respec-
tively. Based on the initial knowledge, it has been found
that the probabilities of occurrence of other severity levels,
such as near misses, mishaps and incidents gradually
Table 6 Cumulative precursor data of abnormal events simulated over ten years of TENORM occupational exposure P(Xi and data)
Years C1 Safe C2 Near miss C3 Mishap C4 Incident C5 Accident C6 Catastrophe
1 0.184 0.075 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.001
2 0.169 0.072 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.002
3 0.170 0.070 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.002
4 0.161 0.071 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.003
5 0.144 0.071 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.003
6 0.117 0.078 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.004
7 0.108 0.065 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.006
8 0.100 0.060 0.008 0.006 0.012 0.008
9 0.102 0.057 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.010
10 0.083 0.045 0.007 0.006 0.014 0.018
Table 7 Likelihood failure probabilities for all safety barriers P(Xi and data)
Years EDSPB IISPB PPE&EDSPB EMSPB M&0 PB
1 0.328 0.164 0.577 0.574 0.259
2 0.349 0.205 0.645 0.667 0.226
3 0.344 0.215 0.681 0.670 0.255
4 0.361 0.219 0.694 0.704 0.272
5 0.398 0.256 0.631 0.720 0.305
6 0.464 0.231 0.666 0.705 0.353
7 0.467 0.312 0.729 0.744 0.362
8 0.485 0.362 0.762 0.757 0.394
9 0.475 0.383 0.780 0.779 0.470
10 0.519 0.497 0.854 0.837 0.569
J Petrol Explor Prod Technol
123
increased from 0.107 to 0.201, 0.001 to 0.008, and
6.4 9 10-5 to 0.002, respectively, as the system started to
degrade. The obtained results from this model provided
both qualitative and quantitative information about
TENORM occupational exposure risk in the oil and gas
industry. These results indicated that the proposed model is
applicable to practical applications with the occurrence of a
safe mode higher than fatal cancer causing event(s) (ac-
cording to general medical radiological cancer data).
The rational prediction and Bayesian updating theorem
adopted in the second phase of the SMART approach were
utilized to predict the failure likelihood and update the
prior failure probabilities of the identified safety barriers
over the ten-year period. The prediction attempted to pre-
sent a better visualization of the safety performance in ten-
year time so that appropriate decisions can be made. As
shown in Fig. 4, Bayesian posterior probability values for
the safety barrier failures have drastically increased as a
result of system degradation within the 10-year period.
This degradation could be attributed to many reasons, the
most important being a dearth of dynamic and quantitative
radiological risk assessment studies related to TENORM
risks in the oil and gas Industry. In addition, some of the
legislation and TENORM-producing industries are reluc-
tant to admit the presence of radiological risks in its
operation despite avoiding any association with the word
‘‘nuclear’’ (ALNabhani et al. 2016a). Some industries
consider that exposure to TENORM at a low dose is safe,
while the medical community considering it unsafe
according to their epidemiological studies (ALNabhani
et al. 2016b). Furthermore, the implementation of cost-
cutting plans by some industries may inhibit safety barriers
improvement. Accordingly, the system will continue to
degrade.
Table 8 Posterior failure probability data for safety barriers performance updated over 10 years P(Xi|data)
Years EDSPB IISPB PPE&EDSPB EMSPB M&OPB
1 0.109 0.010 0.067 0.130 0.037
2 0.118 0.013 0.087 0.182 0.031
3 0.116 0.014 0.101 0.184 0.037
4 0.124 0.015 0.107 0.209 0.040
5 0.142 0.018 0.083 0.223 0.047
6 0.178 0.016 0.095 0.210 0.057
7 0.179 0.023 0.124 0.244 0.059
8 0.190 0.029 0.144 0.257 0.067
9 0.185 0.032 0.157 0.281 0.090
10 0.212 0.049 0.235 0.363 0.128
Fig. 4 Posterior failure
probability distribution of safety
barriers failure over 10 years
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The posterior failure probabilities of safety barriers were
utilized in the third phase and were fed into event tree
branches to estimate the updated occurrence probabilities of
consequences. The results demonstrated system degradation
cause the end-state probability (consequence occurrences
probability) to change dramatically over the ten-year period.
Prior probability of occurrence of the safe (C1) condition
being high, its posterior probability was gradually reduced
Fig. 5 Overall variation of
updated consequence
occurrence probability
distributions over a period of
10 years for range of events
J Petrol Explor Prod Technol
123
from 0.89 to 0.79 as time increased, as illustrated in Fig. 5f.
This sharp drop raises concerns for its implication that the
industry should be able to prevent such system degradation
at early stages if the identified safety barriers were for early-
stage activities. For instance, if an early detection prevention
barrier was in place it will allow the industry to predict the
Fig. 5 continued
J Petrol Explor Prod Technol
123
presence of TONERM in their oilfield and well holdings at
early stages by correlating logging data that contains
radioactivity data, which are in fact utilized as an indicator
of the presence of oil and gas of targeted pay zone formation
(ALNabhani et al. 2015), and therefore, appropriate safety
precautions can be taken. As a consequence of the safe mode
Fig. 5 continued
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deficiency, posterior probabilities of occurrence of incidents,
accidents and catastrophes continued to drastically increase
overtime, as shown in Fig. 5a–c respectively. The continual
drastic increase could be attributed to failure of the subse-
quent safety barriers. If the first safety barrier failed,
TENORM would then be brought up from the rock reservoir
that hold oil and gas in their matrix, along with oil and gas
extraction and production activities, and continue to flow
from the drilled wells to gathering and production stations
and finally to the refinery via well completion equipment,
flow lines and associated equipment (Holland 1998; Jonkers
et al. 1997; Wilson and Scott 1992; Hamlat et al. 2001;
Abdel-Sabour 2014). This equipment is unfortunately not
radiologically insulated or designed to prevent gamma
radiation emitted by TENORM passing through or in their
scale depositions. As a result of the failure of second safety
barrier, many workers involved in oil and gas extraction and
production activities are at risk of being exposed to different
radiation levels. In particular, current standard personal
protective equipment (third safety prevention barrier) is not
designed to handle accidental exposure to any radiation,
let alone for nearly constant daily, weekly and even year
long exposure times. The risk of exposure to radiation doses
at elevated levels may develop into fatal cancer within
10 years of continuous and cumulative exposure. According
to the model results, the posterior probability of a fatal
cancer catastrophe (C6) improved greatly during the ten
years of continuous exposure; however, it has a sharp
increasing tendency in probability from 3.6 9 10-07 to
1.1 9 10-4 as shown in Fig. 5a that is almost a 3000-fold
increase, which raises serious concerns. Most importantly,
some safety barriers such as the Emergency Management
Safety Prevention Barrier (EMSPB) and Management and
the Organization Safety Prevention Barrier (M&OSPB) can
interact and intervene with the whole safety system at any
stage during operation and their interaction can promote
safety strategies, or in the opposite manner, weaken the
safety system based on the management’s behavior and their
awareness of safety importance. This can be clearly
observed when looking to the posterior occurrence proba-
bilities of near miss (C2), mishap (C3), incident (C4) and
accident (C5) that frequently occur in the industry. Fig-
ure 5b–e shows a fluctuating trend between steadily rising
and sudden sharp increases overtime. The reason behind the
fluctuation is that only in the events of observing radiation
are the preventive measures applied based on its causal
factors and occurrence frequency and, therefore, prove this
phenomenon. However, over extended time periods, the
system re-exhibits performance impairment.
Conclusions
TENORM is a potentially serious environmental and occu-
pational risk in oil and gas operations. To assess radiation
exposure risk to workers, a new methodology of dynamic
modeling scenario-based risk assessmentwas proposed. This
model was based on SMART approach that integrates the
SHIPP methodology and rational theory. This approach
provided a systematic and comprehensive risk assessment
framework based on safety barrier performance evaluation
and analysis. Five important safety barriers were identified
and are considered to provide workers sufficient protection
from radiation exposure during oil and gas extraction and
production activities. The SMART approach provides a
systematic framework for modeling, predicting, updating
andmanaging the TENORMexposure risk during oil and gas
production. This paper is considered as the first fruits in the
radiological occupational exposure risk assessment area of
the oil and gas industry to quantify TENORM risk and
interpret it with safety barrier performance. Based on the
results, it is apparent there is a need to develop appropriate
safety measures for protecting against radiation exposure
during extraction and production of oil and gas and to find an
effective scientifically based solution to minimize the large
radiological waste volume created during production that
can result in serious radiological issues for workers, the
public and the environment. The future works yet to be
explored according to the SMART approach process
flowchart are the estimation of the TENORM economic risk,
and to establish a successful and thorough TENORM man-
agement system.
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Table 9 Posterior estimate of occurrence probability of each con-
sequence in year 10
Consequences (Ck) Occurrence probability P(Ck)
C1 (Safe) 0.788
C2 (Near miss) 0.201
C3 (Mishap) 8 9 10
-3
C4 (Incident) 1.6 9 10
-3
C5 (Accident) 7.8 9 10
-4
C6 Catastrophe 1.1 9 10
-4
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